Strategic Party Government

Why Winning Trumps Ideology

Koger Gregory, Lebo Matthew J.

Why is Congress mired in partisan polarization? The conventional answer is that members of Congress and their constituencies fundamentally disagree with one other along ideological lines. But Gregory Koger and Matthew J. Lebo uncover a more compelling reason that today's political leaders devote so much time to conveying their party's positions, even at the expense of basic government functions: Both parties want to win elections. In "Strategic Party Government", Koger and Lebo argue that Congress is now primarily a forum for partisan competition. In order to avoid losing, legislators unite behind strong party leaders, even when they do not fully agree with the policies their party is advocating. They do so in the belief that party leaders and voters will reward them for winning – or at least trying to win – these legislative contests. And as the parties present increasingly united fronts, partisan competition intensifies and pressure continues to mount for a strong party-building strategy – despite considerable disagreement within the parties. By bringing this powerful but underappreciated force in American politics to the forefront, Koger and Lebo provide a new interpretation of the problems facing Congress that is certain to reset the agenda for legislative studies.

About the Author

Gregory Koger is associate professor of political science at the University of Miami. He is the author of "Filibustering: A Political History of Obstruction in the House and Senate", also published by the University of Chicago Press.

Matthew J. Lebo is professor of political science at Stony Brook University, where he also directs the Center for Behavioral Political Science.

Reviews

"'Strategic Party Government' represents a significant advance in the study of Congress. Koger and Lebo present a well-argued and persuasive theoretical perspective and provide a variety of new empirical angles on the classic question of how and why parties matter in Congress" – John W. Patty, University of Chicago

"Koger and Lebo's emphasis on strategic parties synthesizes, indeed subsumes, existing approaches to legislative parties – conditional party government theory, cartel theory, and theories of vote buying. Their focus on existential motivations for legislative parties – the need to win elections, district by district, and the aspiration to command legislative majorities – provides an essential connection between legislative politics and the electoral arena" – Kenneth A. Shepsle, Harvard University

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