Success and Failure in Limited War
Information and Strategy in the Korean, Vietnam, Persian Gulf, and Iraq Wars
Common and destructive, limited wars are significant international events that pose a number of challenges to the states involved beyond simple victory or defeat. Chief among these challenges is the risk of escalation – be it in the scale, scope, cost, or duration of the conflict. In this book, Spencer D. Bakich investigates a crucial and heretofore ignored factor in determining the nature and direction of limited war: information institutions. Traditional assessments of wartime strategy focus on the relationship between the military and civilians, but Bakich argues that we must take into account the information flow patterns among top policy makers and all national security organizations. By examining the fate of American military and diplomatic strategy in four limited wars, Bakich demonstrates how not only the availability and quality of information, but also the ways in which information is gathered, managed, analyzed, and used, shape a state's ability to wield power effectively in dynamic and complex international systems. Utilizing a range of primary and secondary source materials, "Success and Failure in Limited War" makes a timely case for the power of information in war, with crucial implications for international relations theory and statecraft.
About the Author
Spencer D. Bakich is associate professor in the Department of Government and International Affairs at Sweet Briar College. He lives in Charlottesville, VA.
Reviews
"Bakich addresses an important puzzle – the sources of mixed strategic success in US experience with limited wars since World War II – by advancing a novel argument concerning the role of 'information institutions'. 'Success and Failure in Limited War' provides a very useful framework that both complements the mountain of historical and decision making literature on the Korean and Vietnam conflicts, as well as integrates emerging insights from many insiders regarding contemporary decision-making in the two Iraq wars. The real payoff: Bakich compensates for gaps in the dominant realist, domestic politics, and constructivist arguments" – Adam N. Stulberg, Georgia Institute of Technology
"Bakich has given us a 'must read' study: he brilliantly explains how information flows (and their absence) definitively shape the success of wartime decision making and he provides a highly readable history of the limited wars that have consumed US foreign policy over the past sixty years. Policy makers, scholars, and students alike will find this book invaluable" – Jeffrey W. Legro, University of Virginia
"Even more than most enterprises, limited wars are characterized by uncertainty, and Bakich's great contribution is to focus on the role of institutions that gather and process information in influencing their outcomes. With a good theory involving both diplomats and the armed forces and thorough case studies, this book is both fascinating and important" – Robert Jervis, Columbia University, author of "Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War"
