Our Latest Longest War
Losing Hearts and Minds in Afghanistan
The first rule of warfare is to know one's enemy. The second is to know thyself. More than fifteen years and three quarters of a trillion dollars after the US invasion of Afghanistan, it's clear that the United States followed neither rule well. America's goals in Afghanistan were lofty to begin with: dismantle al Qaeda, remove the Taliban from power, remake the country into a democracy. But not only did the mission come completely unmoored from reality, the United States wasted billions of dollars, and thousands of lives were lost".Our Latest Longest War" is a chronicle of how, why, and in what ways the war in Afghanistan failed. Edited by historian and Marine lieutenant colonel Aaron B. O'Connell, the essays collected here represent nine different perspectives on the war – all from veterans of the conflict, both American and Afghan. Together, they paint a picture of a war in which problems of culture and an unbridgeable rural-urban divide derailed nearly every field of endeavor. The authors also draw troubling parallels to the Vietnam War, arguing that deep-running ideological currents in American life explain why the US government has repeatedly used armed nation-building to try to transform failing states into modern, liberal democracies. In Afghanistan, as in Vietnam, this created a dramatic mismatch of means and ends that neither money, technology, nor the force of arms could overcome. The war in Afghanistan has been the longest in US history, and in many ways, the most confounding. Few who fought in it think it has been worthwhile. These are difficult topics for any American or Afghan to consider, especially those who lost friends or family in it. This sobering history – written by the very people who have been fighting the war – is impossible to ignore.
About the Author
Aaron B. O'Connell is lieutenant colonel in the Marine Corps Reserve and the author of "Underdogs: The Making of the Modern Marine Corps". Most recently, he was associate professor of history at the US Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland.
Reviews
"Nothing has ever been easy in the shadow of the Hindu Kush, and the essays in 'Our Latest Longest War' convey that accurately, thoughtfully, and unblinkingly. This superb collection of essays by scholars and practitioners illuminates the innumerable challenges and harsh realities with which those of us engaged in Afghanistan contended in our collective endeavor to ensure that the country was never again a sanctuary for Al Qaeda or other transnational extremists – as it was when the 9/11 attacks were planned there" – General David Petraeus, US Army (Ret), Commander, US Central Command 2008-2010, Intnl Security Assistance Force and US Forces in Afghanistan 2010-2011
"Brings together a group of uniquely qualified and talented authors to examine US military operations in Afghanistan... This is a difficult read about the complex subject of culture as applied to a complex nation-state. Much of it deals with the inability of Americans to solve Afghanistan's problems. However, for those interested in US national security issues and the limits of power, O'Connell's volume is necessary reading" – Publishers Weekly
"'Our Latest Longest War' is a unique collection of essays, written by those who actually implemented Afghanistan policy in the field, not by the senior government officials halfway around the world in Washington. The complexity and difficulty of counterinsurgency warfare are made clear in this superbly edited book. A must read for government and military leaders tempted to frame decisions as overly simplistic binary choices, and for those who are called upon to serve at 'the tip of the spear' and face realities not understood and acknowledged at the strategic level" – Karl W. Eikenberry, ambassador and Lieutenant General, retired, US Army, Oksenberg-Rohlen Distinguished Fellow, Stanford
"A measured and clear-eyed look at the deep rooted challenges embedded in the ongoing effort to achieve a stable and successful outcome in Afghanistan – many of which are of our own making through inattention to the history and culture of this complex nation. As NATO Commander with overall strategic command of the operation, I watched four successive ISAF Commanders – loyal subordinates and brilliant Generals all – try and fail to overcome the inherent contradictions in our approach. This collection of well sourced essays illuminates our collective failures, despite the best of intentions" – Admiral James Stavridis, USN (Ret), Supreme Allied Commander at NATO 2009-2013
